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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal following the denial of William Leer's petition for post-conviction
relief. Clerk's Record (CR) 96.
B. Procedural Histow and Statement of Facts
Appellant William Leer entered a conditional plea of guilty to a single count of
trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine on November 18,2004, retaining the right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. CR 1 1, 13
Erilc Lehtinen of the State Appellate Public Defender was appointed to represent William
on appeal. While the notice of appeal included the issue that the District Court erred in denying
Williain's motion to suppress, Erik decided not to raise that issue, electing instead to argue tbat
William's sentence was excessive. CR 17. No relief was granted and William's appeal became
final on June 9,2006. CR 3 1
On July 31, 2006, Erilc sent William a letter which stated in part:

In recent weelcs I have come to realize that my perfomlance in prosecuting your
direct appeal may have been inadequate, thus giving rise to a post-conviction
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for you. As you may recall,
you entered into a conditional guilty plea, expressly reserving your right to appeal
the denial of your suppression motion, under the assumption that the suppression
issue would, in fact, be appealed. However, when I reviewed your case, I
concluded that the suppression issue was frivolous and, thus, did not raise it on
appeal. I am afraid that by failing to raise the suppression issue for you, I may
have inadvertently rendered your guilty plea unknowing and involuntary, perhaps
entitling you to either withdraw your plea or have a new appeal wherein the
suppression issue is raised.
Unfortunately for you, I stand by my assessment (outlined in my October 26,2005
letter to you) that the suppression issue would not have been viable on appeal.
Nevertheless, since you entered a guilty plea based on your expectation that the

issue would be appealed, it seems to me that you should have some recourse now.

On March 27,2007, based upon this letter, William filed apro se motion with the District
Court seelcing appointment o f counsel to assist in filing a petition for post-conviction relief. CR
35. In his motion, William explained to the Court that he had suffered an injury while at the

prison which had resulted in significant brain injury and diminished mental capacity making selfrepresentation impossible. CR 35.
The Court granted William's motion and appointed the Ada County Public Defender.
That officedecided to contract his case out to conflict counsel, but did not do so until July 18,
2007, approximately six weeks after the one year time limit for filing a post-conviction petition
expired. CR 66.
On October 2,2007, appointed conflict counsel filed a petition. The petition contains the
following claim:
Upon information and belief Petitioner asserts Appellate Counsel failed to provide
effectiveassistance o f counsel, as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment o f the
United States Constitution, and under the provisions o f Article 1, Section 13 o f
the Idaho Constitution, by failing to vigorously and zealously represent his client.
Specifically,Petitioner alleges Appellate Counsel failed to address the Petitioner's
issue regarding the denial o f his motion to suppress. Trial Counsel, Petitioner and
the Court agreed the plea would be offered with the expressed understanding the
issue regarding the denial o f the suppression motion would be litigated in a higher
court. Appellate Counsel's failure to address the issue on appeal represents a
breach o f an understanding the Petitioner had when he decided to waive his
constitutional rights and plead guilty. He asserts he was lead to plead guilty on a
false promise that the issue would be litigated and when it was not his plea was
rendered involuntary.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests the Court vacate the conviction and sentence
imposed by allowing the Petitioner to withdraw his plea and reset the matter ibr
trial, or in the alternative re-sentence the Petitioner and allow him to pursue his

issue on appeal, or grant any such other relief as inay be just and equitable in the
premises.
CR 6-7.

In response, the state filed a motion for summary dismissal. The state argued that
William's petition should be dismissed, first, because he failed to allege facts which would
entitle him to relief. The essence of the state's argument was that William's plea, which was
voluntary at the time it was entered, could not be rendered involuntary by the failure of appellate
counsel to brief an issue on appeal. The state maintained that William bad bargained for the right
to raise the issue on appeal, and he received that right. By not following through with argument
on the issue, appellate counsel may have been ineffective, but counsel did not invalidate the
original plea. The slate next argued that the petition should be summarily dismissed because
William had failed to aver sufficient facts to make apviinafacie showing that appellate counsel
was constitutionally ineffective. The state argued that William failed to allege any facts to
demonstrate that counsel's decision not to argue the suppression motion on appeal fell below an
objective standard of coinpetence or how this decision prejudiced him. Finally, the state argued
that the petition should be summarily disinissed because it was untimely. CR 23-25.
The District Court held a hearing on the state's motion. At that hearing, William's
counsel told the court that the state had offered to withdraw its motion and stipulate to having
William's right to appeal reinstated so that he could argue the suppression motion in the
appellate court. However, Williain had declined that offer because he wanted to have his plea
actually withdrawn. Tr. 3114108 p. 8.
At the end of the hearing, the District Court exercised its discretion to allow an equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations and set the case over for a hearing on the merits. Tr. 3/14/08

In discussions on setting that hearing, William's counsel told the Court that he sensed that
the Coui-t was leaning toward allowiilg Williai~~
to have his suppression motion heard by an
appellate court. In response, the Court stated, in part:
That's exactly what 1 would do. This was the most difficult motion to suppress
I've ever encountered in my life. It really was. I worked on it harder than any
other motion to suppress I ever had. It was factually a very difficult decision. I
made the decision, and I think that the record I made of the decision, it is what it
is, and I made the decision 1 made. . . .

. . . It was a real mess factually, and I remember being very surprised when the
appeal did not include an appeal of the issue that had been preserved for appeal on
the Rule 11.
Tr. 3/14/08 p. 21-23,
At the hearing on the petition, both Erik Lehtinen and William testified
As the hearing began, William was asked to waive his attomey/client privilege with Erik.
At that time, some of the scope of William's brain injury became evident. The following
transpired:
The Court: Mr. Leer, what are you taking? The reason I'm asking this is - for the
record, I'm observing your demeanor here in the courtroom today, and you appear
to be confused. Are you confused?
William Leer: Yeah. But, I'm okay. Okay? That's just fiom my head
The Court: Have you suffered a - not an injury, but didn't you suffer some sort of
a medical emergency while you've been incarcerated?
William Leer: Yeah.
The Court: What happened?

William Leer: I don't know for sure, but they said I was playing racquetball and
something happened to me. And they said I was going to die, and they cut my
bead open from here somewhere and back here and took some brain out. And
that's why sometimes I don't - sometimes when I'm not Counsel: It's okay, Bill. Take your time
William Leer: Sometimes it's hard for me to remember things and concentrate,
and I get nervous and stuff when I don't know for sure what - yeah, okay.
The Court: Mr. Leer, we're going to take our time today. We don't have any other
pressing business at all today. It's just you and your attorney, Mr. DeFranco here,
and the prosecuting attoiney and the court staff.
And the purpose of this hearing today is to see whether or not your lawyer, Mr.
DeFranco, is able to convince me as the judge that your attorney here, the
gentleman who is on the witness stand, had failed to represent you properly on the
appeal. Do you understand?
Willia111Leer: Okay. I've been reading that a lot,
Tr. 5/1/08 p. 9-10.
Williarn thereafter waived his attorneyiclient privilege with Erik and the hearing
proceeded. Tr. 5/1/08 p. 11.
Erik testified that the notice of appeal in William's case included the issue of whether the
suppression motion had been improperly denied. Tr. 5/1/08 p. 12. However, he decided not to
argue the issue in the appellate court. Tr. 5/1/08 p. 13
After Erik filed the brief in Willianl's case, he learned that the office policy of the State
Appellate Public Defender is to raise all issues identified as part of conditional guilty pleas.
Based upon that policy, he wrote the letter to William expressing the opinion that his actions may
have rendered William's plea involuntary. Tr. 5/1/08 p. 13
While Erik had not met William in person prior to the hearing on post-conviction, he had

spoken with him several times on the phone and ltnew that Willian~believed his suppression
issue was a good issue. Erik also initially believed that. However, after reviewing the transcripts
of the suppression hearing, Erik deternlined that there were no viable issues with regard to
suppression. Tr. 5/1/08 p. 21-23. Erik's opinion was and remained that there were no issues he
could have in good conscience raised in the appellate court. Tr. 5/1/08 p. 41
Erik also testified that his decision not to raise the suppression issue was not strategic in
that it was not made for William's benefit. Also, Erik testified that it was unlikely that he
consulted other attorneys in his office about this decision because if he had, he would have been
told to raise the issue because it was preserved in a conditional plea. Tr. 5/1/08 p. 44-45
William testified that he cannot remember much about the plea in this case because it
happened before his brain injury. However, he can remember some because it was written down.
He did not take the original unconditional plea offer because his other attorney told him that his
case would likely be overturned on appeal. He took the conditional plea because that preserved
his ability to appeal the suppression issue. Tr. 5/1/08 p. 52-53.
At the close of the hearing, the District Court attempted to clarify the issue, stating:
And, if either of the attorneys disagree with this characterization, this is an issue
of whether or not Mr. Lehtinen, the petitioner's appellate attorney, provided
ineffective assistance of counsel, depriving Mr. Leer of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in failing to pursue the suppression issue 011 appeal without first
consulting him.
First of all, whether or not the course of action that Mr. Lehtinen testified to today
and is otherwise supported by the record, would constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel when viewed from an objective point of view. In other words, the first
prong of the Strickland test, and if so, whether or not the defendant was
prejudiced by that course of action. Fair enough?
Tr. 5/1/08 p. 55

To this, William's attorney responded:
It is. Your Honor, that tracks perfectly with the way I laid it out. The only
corollary is the fact that I apply contract principles to the matter, and I think - I
guess the only other nuance is that Mr. Medema has argued that just by virtue of
the fact that appellate counsel was able to take a look at it, that the Rule 11 was
satisfied, where our opinion was it needed to be championed. . . ."
Tr. 5/1/08 p. 55-56.
Thereafter, William's counsel filed a memorandum in which he argued both that
appellate counsel invalidated the plea agreement when he failed to argue the suppression issue on
appeal, and that counsel was ineffective in abandoning an issue that was the "lteart and soul" of
the plea agreement. He also raised the argument that Erik's failure lo argue the suppression issue
was tantamount to a molioil to withdraw and this was unfair and prejudicial. CR 59-65.
The District Court subsequently issued a written order denying post-conviction relief,
stating that "Petitioner has failed to show that appellate counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness nor is the Court persuaded that there would be a reasonable
possibility that the Petitioner would have prevailed on an appeal of the suppression issue." CR
70-7 1.
This appeal timely followed. CR 73.
111. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Was William denied constitutionally effective assistance of appellate couilsel when
counsel did not argue on appeal that the District Court erred in denying William's suppression
motion given that the arrest and search of William violated state and federal constitutional rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures? U.S. Const. Amend. 4, 14, Idaho Const. Art. 1, 5
17.

2. In the alternative, was William denied constitutionally effective assistance of appellate

counsel when appellate counsel acted, witl~outany strategic purpose, to vitiate the Rule 11 plea
agreement William had entered by denying William the bargained for benefit of appellate review
of the suppression motion?
IV. ARGUMENT
A. Williain Was Denied Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel When
Cou~~sel
Failed to Argue the Meritorious Suppression Issue
Appellate counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to argue the meritorious
suppression issue. And, counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial to William because it is
reasonably probable that, had counsel argued the suppression issue, Williain would have
prevailed and the case against him ultimately would have been dismissed for lack of admissible
evidence. Because there was deficient performance of appellate counsel and resulting prejudice,
the District Court ened in denying William's petition for post-conviction relief. Striclcland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil proceeding. Therefore, the petitioner
must only prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho
847, 849, 103 P.3d 460,462 (2004); Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933,935, 120 P.3d 751,753
(Ct. App. 2005). When reviewing a decision denying post-conviction relief afier an evidentiary
hearing, the appellate court will not uphold the lower court's factual findings when they are
clearly erroneous. McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 849, 103 P.3d at 462; Loveland, 141 Idaho at 936, 120
P.3d at 754. The appellate court exercises free review ofthe district court's application of the
relevant law to the facts. McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 849, 103 P.3d at 46; Loveland, 141 Idaho at

936, 120 P.3d at 754.
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-852,a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to
effectiveassistance o f counsel during any appeal. See Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685,687,
905 P.2d 86, 88 (1995). Further, the Due Process Clause o f the Fourteenth Amendment requires
states to ensure that an indigent appellant receive effectiveassistance o f counsel on his first
appeal o f right from a judgment o f conviction. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,396 (1985);
Avagon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,765,760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988). A defendant claiming

ineffective assistance o f counsel will prevail i f he shows that ( 1 ) counsel's performance was
deficient and, that (2)counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v.
Washingtorz,supra. A defendant meets the deficiency prong when counsel's performance falls

below an objective standard o f reasonableness. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 277,971 P.2d
727,730 (1998);Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,760,760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). The
prejudice prong is met when the defendant shows that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for couiisel's errors, the result o f the appeal would have been different. Mitchell, 132 Idaho at
277,971 P.2d at 730.
Here, appellate counsel did not perform in an objectively reasonable manner because he
failed to argue that the District Court erred in denying the motion to suppress, which was the best
argument to be made and, instead, only argued that William's sentence was an abuse o f
discretion. Moreover, had appellate counsel raised the suppression issue, there is a reasonable
probability the result o f William's appeal would have been different.

1. The Decision to Abandon the Suppression Issue on Aupeal was
not Obiectivelv Reasonable
Appellate counsel is required to make a conscieiltious exainination of the case and file a
brief in support of the best arguments to be made. Jalcoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280,285, 32 P.3d
672, 677 (Ct. App. 2001); LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 119,937 P.2d 427,431 (Ct. App.
1997). I11 this case, appellate counsel testified that he reviewed the record and concluded that it
would be frivolous to pursue the suppressioil issue on appeal. Instead, counsel decided to
challe~~ge
William's sentence as excessive. Appellate counsel's conduct in reaching this decision
fails to meet objective standards of competence.
In order to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, and thus an abuse of the
court's discretion, the appellant must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho 66,70, 106
P.3d 392,396 (2005). Such challenges are rarely successful. See Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho at 71,
106 P.3d at 397; State v. Calley, 140 Idaho 663, 666, 99 P.3d 616, 619 (2004); State v. Jeppesen,
138 Idaho 71, 76, 57 P.3d 782, 787 (2002); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,462, 50 P.3d 472,477
(2002); State v. Trevirzo, 132 Idaho 888, 897,980 P.2d 552, 561 (1999). Conversely, the
standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908,912,
136 P.3d 379, 383 (Ct. App. 2006). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the
appellate court will accept the trial court's findings of fact only if they are supported by
substantial evidence and freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as
found. Id.
Accordingly, a suppression issue generally has a better chance of success on appeal than

an argument that the district court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences. It was

objectively unreasonable for appellate counsel to conclude that a challenge to William's
sentence, instead of a challenge to the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, was the
best argument to be made. Indeed, the District Judge himself noted that the suppression motion
was very complicated and that it was one of the most difficult suppression motions he had ever
decided and that it was a decision he expected to have reviewed on appeal. To abandon the
suppression issue on appeal was not objectively reasonable.
2. William was Prejudiced by Counsel's Abandonment of the
Suvvression Issue Because the District Court Erred in not
Suppressing Evidence Obtained Pursuant to an Unconstitutional
Arrest and Search
a. Facts Relevant to Suppression Motion
On April 21,2004, narcotics detective Nicole Loveland was conducting surveillance at
the Shilo Motor Inn and other motels in Boise, looking for Da~renParton. She was hoping to do
a controlled buy with him, because she had information from several sources that Parton was
delivering methamphetamine. Tr. 6/3/04 p. 2-3. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 93.' However, even though
Detective Loveland was looking for Parton, she also believed that William, who up to this time,
she had never seen, represented a "bigger target." Tr. 9117104 p. 93
Detective Loveland testified that, on April 13, 2004, Steven Wolfe was arrested for
having methamphetamine in his vehicle. Without offering any testimony as to Mr. Wolfe's
background, basis of Itnowledge, or motives, Detective Loveland offered that Mr. Wolfe claimed

'

In deciding the suppression motion, the District Court relied on evidence from the
preliminary hearing held 613104 and the suppression hearing held 9117104. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 9. The
record in this case has been augmented with both transcripts and the Clerk's Record from the
direct appeal.

to be working for William who had been staying at the Shilo Inn on April 13. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 94.
Wolfe gave police a description of a house he claimed was William's. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 95-

96. However, Detective Loveland did not testify that any efforts were made to verify that this
house belonged to or was occupied by William. Rather, her testimony was only that police drove
by the address Wolfe offered and there was indeed a house there that matched his description of a
house and that it had a car in front that matched Wolfe's description of a car. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 9596.
Later in her testimony, Detective Loveland stated that Wolfe had referred to both
"William" and "Billy," and had also offered the last name "Leer." Tr. 9117104 p. 104.
By April 16,2004, Wolfe had bonded out ofjail and managed to get arrested again.
Again, he talked with the sheriffs office, and again he accused William of staying at the Shilo
In1 and having in his possession methamphetamine and "a bagful of guns." Wolfe claimed that

William had given him and Richard Stevens methamphetamine to deliver. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 97.
On April 19,2004, Detective Loveland and Detective Bustos went to the Shilo Inn to
determine whether, as Wolfe claimed, Willian~was renting a room there. However, the Shilo
Inn's records did not show William as a guest. Rather, the room in question had been rented to
Marlha Maxwell. Detective Loveland testified that, according to an unnamed confidential
informant, Martha was Parton's girlfriend. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 99.
While Detective Loveland never offered testimony as to her assess~nentof Wolfe's
credibility, the following can be gleaned from the record: 1) Wolfe was involved with
methamphetamine; 2) he was arrested twice for this in the course of four days; 3) he was able to
accurately describe a house and car; 4) he was wrong about whether William had been renting a

room at the Shilo 11111; and 5) about 25 or 30 years ago as a juvenile, he had been convicted of
murder and had lopped out his sentence. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 95-97,99, 130.
Detective Loveland also offered a passing reference to Richard Stevens who was arrested
with Wolfe on April 16. She said Stevens also accused William of dealing drugs out of the Shilo
Inn. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 108. However, she offered no testimony whatsoever as to who Stevens was,
what his reason for offering information to the police was, and what, if anything, was his basis of
Itnowledge. The only thing Detective Loveland could offer about Stevens was that he had been
arrested with Wolfe and had previously been in prison for felonies. Tr. 9/14/04 p. 97, 131.
Detective Loveland said that there was a connection between William and Parton. She
testified "Mr. Parton's nanie was from a separate entity in itself, which I know to be involved
with Mr. Leer." And, she offered that Parton's car had been seen outside the house that Wolfe
claimed belonged to Leer. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 98. She also said that during the investigation of
Parton, a confidential informant who was not further described had stated that Parlon's source
was Billy. I-Iowever, the C1 also said that she did not know Billy, nor had she ever met him. Tr.
9/17/04 p. 105.
This was the sum total of the information the narcotics officers had that they believed
could be tied to William as of April 21. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 105.
Detective Loveland testified that if she had thought that she had enough information to
establish probable cause for either a search warrant of the room at the Shilo Inn or for the arrest
of William, she would have sought out such warrants. But, not having enough information,
neither she nor her partner applied for warrants. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 109-112.
On the 21", Detective Loveland and her partner were watching Parton's car outside the

Shilo Inn. Somehow, during the surveillance, two people managed, without being seen by the
detectives, to get into the car and start it. The first thing the detectives saw was the car
"suddenly" moving. They could also see that there were two occupants and that the driver was
male. They followed the car. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 101.
After following the car to the Owyhee Plaza motel, the detectives followed it farther to a
McDonald's on Fairview. Tr. 9117/04 p. 101. There, the detectives decided to contact a Boise
police officer to have that officer ascertain whether the driver was Parton, who had an
outstanding warrant. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 102.
Officer Kristine England was dispatched to the McDonald's. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 13. There,
I

she found the targeted car legally parked against the curb in one of the restaurant's head-in
parking spots with the two occupants in the car eating hamburgers. Tr. 6/3/04 p. 18, Tr. 9/17/04
p. 14.
Officer England activated her patrol lights and parked perpendicularly very slightly to the
right and behind the targeted car so that, "I think that it would have been extremely difficult for
him to back out of there." Tr. 9/17/04 p. 17, 22.
Officer England asked the driver for his driver's license, which he supplied. She ran a
check on the license, and learned that the license was valid, it belonged to William, and he had
no outstanding warrants. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 25, 36.
Officer England lcept William's license and let the narcotics detectives know that he was
not Parton. At that point, Officer Loveland instructed Officer England to hold William because
she and her partner wanted to talk with him. Tr. 9117/04 p. 26-27,36-37.
According to Detective Loveland, her desire at that time was that "I would like to

interview him." And, if he did not want to have such an interview, ''Then, 1 let him go." Tr.
9/17/04 p. 123-124. As Detective Loveland testified, she could not identify any criminal activity
going on at that time which would justify detaining Williain. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 128.
Nonetheless, Officer England was instructed to detain Willianl. However, she "wasn't
going to arrest him on it." Tr. 9/17/04 p. 37. Her testimony was " . . . I had no reason to hold
hiin at that time." Tr. 9/17/04 p. 49. She stated that she had no personal knowledge of any
criminal activity afoot, nor did she have any information that would have led her to believe that
William was armed and dangerous. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 35. Had the narcotics detectives not
instructed her to hold William, he would have been free to go as soon as she checked his license.
Tr. 9/17/04 p. 38.
I-Iowever, having been instructed to hold William, Officer England kept his driver's
license, kept her car parked behind him, and told him that other officers needed to talk to him.
Tr. 9/17/04 p. 26-27. She did not tell hill1 that he was free to leave. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 30. And, so
began a period of waiting. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 28.
Finally after about 15 minutes, a probation and parole officer arrived with a drug dog. Tr.
9/17/04 p. 27, 39. At that time, Officer England told William and his passenger to get out of the
car so that they could have the dog checlc for drugs. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 28. However, William told
her that he would not consent to a search since he had borrowed, but did not own, the car. Tr.
9/17/04 p. 41.
William's objection was ignored and he and his passenger were made to stand, now
guarded by at least two officers, outside the car while the dog sniff search proceeded. Tr. 9/17/04
p. 40.

The first dog search was completed with the dog alerting on the car. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 65.
However, it turned out that using the dog from probation and parole to establish probable cause
for an arrest was contrary to DOC policy and based upon that realization, a second dog was
summoned. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 82-83. So William was required to wait another 30-45 minutes for
the second dog to arrive. Tr. 9117/04 p. 39-40.
Noticing during this wait that William appeared cold, Officer England offered to get his
coat fiom the car for him. Tr. 6/3/04 p. 15. When she took the coat from the car, she elected to
search it for weapons. But, instead of weapons, she found money and a nylon-mesh bag which
she gave to another officer, Officer Lister, to search. Tr. 6/3/04 p. 15.
Officer Lister, searching for weapons, opened the bag. (Officer Lister did not explain
why he could not see through the mesh of the bag to ascertain whether it contained weapons or
why he could not tell by feeling the outside of the mesh bag whether it contained weapons.)
However, once he opened it, he saw that it did not contain weapons, but did contain drug
paraphernalia. And, upon that discovery, he told William that he was under arrest. Tr. 6/3/04 p.
24.
Hearing this announcement, William grabbed his coat and ran. However, he was
immediately caught, handcuffed, and searched. Tr. 6/3/04 p. 25. Shortly thereafter, he was taken
to the jail. Tr. 9/17/04 p. 41.
Following the hattdcuffing of William, the second dog arrived and alerted on the car. The
car was then searched and methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine, and guns were found. Tr.
6/3/04 p. 9.
Based upon these facts, the defense sought suppression arguing that neither exigent

circu~nstancesnor probable cause excused the warrant requirement. Brief in Support of Motion
to Suppress Evide~~ce,
Augmented Record. In reply, the state argued that until the drug dog
arrived, the contact between William and the police was consensual. According to the state, even
though the car was blocked in and the police retained his license and guarded William and the
passenger, once they were out of the car, the police had made no show of authority sufficient to
force William's submission until Officer Lister had searched the blue bag and told him that he
was under arrest. The state also argued that despite the consensual nature of the encounter
between the police and William, the police would have been justified in detaining William
against his will because they had a reasonable belief that Partoil had been driving the car and,
independently, a reasonable belief that the car contained drugs. State's Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, Augmented Record.
In its Menlorai~duinDecision and Order, the District Court denied the suppression
motion. The Coui-t held that the facts that: 1) William was being investigated for drug dealing; 2)
had just lefi the Shilo Lnn where detectives were told he would be involved in drug dealing; and

3) detectives had been told that Parton dealt drugs out of his car, were sufficient to hnn a
reasonable suspicion to support William's "brief' detention while the police waited for the first
drug dog. The Court wrote that "Considering Detective Loveland's testimony as a whole, the
Court finds the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was
afoot." And, the Court further found that the brief detention did not ripen into a full blown arrest
until after the first dog alerted on the car and at that point, the police had probable cause for a
warrantless search of the car and probable cause to extend William's detentionlarrest. The Court
also held that the search of the coat did violate William's right to privacy, but since the evidence

would have inevitably been discovered anyway as part of a search incident to arrest, it would not
be suppressed. The Conrt held that by looking into the bag instead of merely feeling it to see if it
contained weapons, Officer Lister violated the Fourth Amendment and his arrest based upon that
violation was tainted. However, the Court further found that probable cause for
a search of the car had been established by the first dog sniff and that the search would have
provided probable cause for arrest and the subsequent search of the coat and the bag. CR Appeal
43-55.
b. The District Court Erred in Deriving the Motion to S u ~ ~ r e s s
Had Erik elected to raise the suppression issue on appeal, the order of the District Court
likely would have been reversed because the detention of William violated the 4'" Amendment of
the United States Constitution as well as Art. I, 3 17 of the Idaho Constitution.

In the appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress, the appellate court gives deference to
the trial court's findings of fact. State v. Bishop,-
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2 (2009), citing State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007). However, findings
of fact will be upheld only if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id.
Detenninations regarding witness credibility, weight given conflicting evidence, and factual
inferences to be drawn are within the discretion of the trial court. Bishop, supra, citing State v.

Saldez-Molirza, 127 Ida110 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995). However, the appellate court
exercises free review over the constitutionality of a search and seizure Bishop, supra, citing State
v. Aguiure, 141 Idaho 560, 562, 112 P.3d 848, 850 (Ct. App.2005).
The Fourth Amendment protects "[tlhe right of the people to be secure in their person,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV.

This guarantee applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,655 (1961).
Likewise, Article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. However, in some instances, the Idaho constitution is more protective of
the right of privacy than is the Fourth Amendment. State v. Webb, 130 Ida110 462,943 P.2d 52
(1997)(when analyzing whether an area is within the curtilage of a defendant's residence, the
district court must first consider the four factors of United Slates v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1984),
and ti~entake into consideration the differences in custom and terrain within the different areas of
the state contemplating particular expectations of privacy); State 1). Cuzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842
P.2d 660 (1992) (good faith exception to exclusionary rule does not apply under the State
Constitution); State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746,760 P.2d 1162 (1988) (installation of pen
register was a search within the meaning of the state constitution.). But see, State ~i Charpentier,
131 Idaho 649,962 P.2d 1033 (1998) (declining to extend state constitutional protection in case
of automobile search incident to arrest of occupants beyond that set out for the Fourth
Amendment in New York V. Belton, 543 U.S. 454 (1981); State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469,20
P.3d 5 (2001) (declining to extend state constitutional protection in case involving garbage
search beyond that set out for the Fourth Amendment in Calqornia v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35
(1988)); and State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 188 P.3d 867 (2008) (finding no protectable privacy
interest in documents tuned over to the health department in order to obtain HIV-related
services.)
Evidence obtained in violation of the 4thAmendment or Article I, section 17, generally
must be suppressed, Bishop at 3, citing, State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454,459

(2004), and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,485 (1963). The test for determining
admissibility is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which
the instant objection is made has come at by exploitation of [the original] illegality or instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488
as quoted in Bishop, supra. Further, in a motion to suppress, the government bears the burden of
demonstrating that the evidence was obtained in accord with the federal and state constitutions.
Bishop, supra, citing State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484,486,95 P.3d 635,637 (2004).

A person is detained for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and Art. I, section 17 when
an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, in some way restrains the liberty of a
citizen. State v. Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903,906, 155 P.3d 704,707 (Ct. App. 2006).
The Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement applies to brief investigative
detentions. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968), Bishop, supra. To detennine whether such
seizures are reasonable, the reviewing court first considers "whether the officer's action was
justified at its inception." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 19-20. The level of justification required
depends on the intrusiveness of the seizure. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20-22. The court then
considers whether the action "was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place." Terry v. Olzio, 392 U.S. at 19-20.
Usually seizures must be based upon probable cause to be reasonable. Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); Bishop at 4. However, liinited investigatory detentions with less
than probable cause are permissible when justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion that a
person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 498.
Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that

can be drawn from those facts. Bishop, supra, citing, State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983,88
P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003) and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21. While reasonable suspicion
requires less information than probable cause, it does require more than mere hunch or "inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion." Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,329-30 (1990) (quoting
Uzited State v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). The determination of whether an officer had a

reasonable suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer
at or before the time of the stop. Bishop, supra, citing Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at
1223; Unitedstates v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417-18 (1981).
An infornlant's tip may give rise to a reasonable suspicion to support a brief detention
when it would "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a stop was appropriate."
White, 496 U.S. at 329 (quoting. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22) (internal quotation and alteration marks

omitted). Analysis of whet21er a tip amounts to reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of
the circumstances including the substance, source, and reliability of the information provided.
Bishop, supra, citing, Wlzite, supra. In short, a tip must possess adequate indicia of reliability in

order to justify a Terry stop. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972). The more reliable
the tip, the less infonnation required to establish reasonable suspicions. White, 496 U.S. at 330.
Factors indicative of reliability include: 1) whether the informants reveals histher identity
and basis of knowledge; 2) whether the location of the informant is known; 3) whether the
infonlration is based on first hand observations of events as they were occurring; 4) whether the
information tlte informant provided was subject to immediate confirmation or corroboration by
police; 5) whetller the infonnant has previously provided reliable information, 5) whether the
informant provides predictive information; and 6) whether the informant could be held criminally

liable if the report were discovered to be false. White, 496 U.S. at 331-32; Williams, 407 U.S. at
146-47; State I . Lauson, 135 Idaho 99, 101-02, 15 P.3d 334,335-37 (Ct. App. 2000); State v.
Bishop at 4. If a tip lacks adequate indicia of reliability, police must engage in further

investigation before conducting a Terry stop. Williams, 407 U.S. at 147; Bishop, supra.
Whether a tip that merely provides a description of a suspect and alleges that he or she
committed a crime amounts to reasonable suspicion depends on whether the tip was anonymous.
See Florida v. JL., 529 U.S. 266, 271-72 (2000); see also State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961,

965,88 P.3d 780, 784 (Ct. App. 2004). When such a tip is received from an anonymous
infoimant, the tip generally will not give rise to reasonable suspicion. See JL., 529 U.S. at 27172 . However, when such a tip is received froin a lcnown citizen-informant, the tip is generally
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Van Dome, 139 Idaho at 965,88 P.3d at 784. Tips
made by known citizen-informants are presumed reliable because the informant's reputation can
be assessed and, if the infonnant is untruthful, he or she may be subject to criminal liability for
making a false report. Id. Accordingly, independent police verification of such tips is generally
not necessary. Id.; see also Williarns,407 U.S. at 146-47. Still, under the totality of the
circumstances analysis, the content of the tip and the informant's basis of knowledge remain
relevant in determining whether the tip gave rise to reasonable suspicion: Bislzop, supra, citing
State v. Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho 703, 708, 169 P.3d 291,296 (Ct. App. 2007).

I11 this case, the District Court correctly found that when Ofecer England parked her
patrol car so that William could not move his car and took his driver's license and retained it,
Williain had been seized for purposes of the state and federal constitutions. State v. Nelson, 134
Idaho 675, 8 P.3d 670 (Ct. App. 2000) (a seizure has occurred when a reasonable person would

not have believed he or she was free to leave.) The question then becomes whether the stop was
justified.
I11 this case, the police testified that they believed Parton was driving the car and that he
had an outstanding warrant. Under these circumstances, an initial stop of the driver was likely
consistent with the state and federal constitutions.
However, the question is whether, once William had identified himself to Officer
England, it was permissible to retain his license, continue to block the car, and make him wait for
a dog search. In other words, did the police have reasonable and articulable suspicion at this
point to support a Terry stop of William?
The police themselves did not believe that a detention was constitutional. Both Officer
England and Detective Loveland testified that they had no basis for holding William and that
they did not intend to hold him against his will.
However, the District Court found that reasonable suspicion existed because William
"was being investigated for drug dealing and had just left a place (the Shilo Inn) where detectives
had been told he would be involved in drug dealing." Further, the police had been told that
Parton dealt drugs out of the car William was currently driving. CR Appeal 49.
This conclusion by the District Court was erroneous. While the police did have the
information from Wolfe and possibly Stevens accusing William of giving them drugs to deliver,
that information was not sufficient to establish a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal
activity by William. As noted above, factors indicative of reliability include: 1) whether the
informant reveals hislher identity and basis of knowledge; 2) whether the location of the
informant is known; 3) whether the information is based on first hand observations of events as

they were occurring; 4) whether the information the info~mantprovided was subject to
immediate confirmation or corroboration by police; 5) whether the informant has previously
provided reliable information, 6) whether the informant provides predicative infonnation; and 7)
whether the informant could be held criminally liable if the report were discovered to be false.
White, 496 U.S. at 331-32; Williams, 407 U.S. at 146-47; Lavson, 135 Idaho 99, 101-02, 15 P.3d

334-335-37 (Ct. App. 2000); Bishop, supm. If a tip lacks adequate indicia of reliability, police
innst engage in further investigation before conducting a Tervy stop. Williums, 407 U.S. at 147;
Bishop, supra.

hi this case, reliability is not indicated. With regard to the first factor, while Wolfe and
Stevens did reveal their identities, neither Wolfe nor Stevens appeared to he credible sources of
information. Both had felony histories. Both were apparently drug users whose drug use may
have affected their ability to accurately perceive w d report. Further, both revealed infonnation
about William in the context of trying to lessen their own criminal liability, a situation fraught
with incentives to provide false informatio~~.
And, finally, no information was provided about
the CI who accused Parton of dealing drugs out ofthe car.
The second factor, whether the location of the informant was known, was not revealed to
the court. Both Wolfe and Stevens had been arrested, but the court was not informed as to
whether the two remained in state custody or whether they had bonded out, and if so, whether
they could be located again.
The third factor, whether the information was based upon first hand observations, would
appear to fall in favor of reliability as Wolfe claimed that he had personally received drugs from
Willianl. Less is known about Stevens' claim. However, this factor must be weighed with the

general credibility of the informants, which was low. If an informant is not credible, the fact that
he makes claims to have personally observed the events he is alleging does nothing to increase
the credibility of his reports. In addition, this information was stale as it was many days old and
did not go to whether William would have illegal drugs at the McDonald's.
The fourtli factor, the element of corroboration, falls against finding the informants' tip
reliable. The informatioil offered by Wolfe and Stevens was corroborated oilly in details which
were as consistent with innocent activity as wit11 criminal activity. Wolfe gave a description of a
house and there was a house in existence which matched his description. However, witliout ally
infonnation specifically linking this house to William and to illegal activity, the description of
the house was without any sort of probative value. Likewise, Wolfe claimed that William had
been renting a room at the Shilo 11111. In the first place, this infonuation was not exactly
corroborated. Police investigation revealed that William was not a guest at the motel. And,
second, even if William had sollie connection with the motel, the mere fact of a person staying at
or visiting guests in a motel is simply not indicative of crilniiial activity. In no other way was
Wolfe's infonnation corroborated. Conzpare State v. Zapata-Reyes, supra, wherein a
description of a car that was not easily distinguishable from other cars was not sufficient to
establish reasoilable suspicion; and Stute v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442,34 P.3d 1125 (Ct. App.
2001), finding that information regarding where a person lived and what type of vehicle he drove
was easily obtainable and did not serve to make a tip more credible.
The fifth factor, whether the informant has previously given reliable information,
militates against finding the informants' tip reliable. No evidence was presented to indicate in
any way that either Wolfe or Stevens had ever before provided reliable information to the police

about anything, let alone about drug dealing.
The sixth factor, whether the infonnant provided predicative infonnation likewise falls
against finding reliability. Wolfe and Stevens reported only on the past. They made no
allegations about what inight happen in the future.
The last factor, whether the informants could be held criminally liable for false
accusations, initially appears to fall toward a finding of reliability. Wolfe and Stevens could
presumably have faced criiuinal problems if they provided false information about William.
However, this presumption must be balanced against the reality of the situation. Wolfe and
Stevens were already in criminal trouble. Wolfe had been arrested twice in less than a week for
drug related activity. Stevens also had been arrested. Both had a tremendous incentive to
provide information, false or otherwise, on other people in order to lessen their own criminal
liability. In this situation, it cannot be said that the possibility of criminal liability for false
infonnation trumps the value of and incentive to provide any information, false or otherwise, and
therefore, there is not a basis for a finding of either credibility or incredibility.
While in this case there was not an anonymous tip, the credibility of the tipsters, given
both their baclcgrounds and their current legal problems, was such that reasonable and articulable
suspicion was not present. Just as the police recognized this, the District Court should have
recognized this.
The District Court also opined that even though the police did not believe that any crime
was in progress at the McDonald's parking lot, they believed that there were drugs in the car
based upon their prior investigation, and that this too provided a reasonable and articulable
suspicion to support William's detention. CR Appeal 50. However, the police did not testify

that they believed there were drugs in the car. Rather, Detective Loveland testified that Parton
had dealt drugs out of the car, not that he was in the habit of storing dlugs in the car.
Additionally, she based this information on tips from a CI. She testified to nothing before the
court to establish the credibility of the CI. Further, she testified that she did not see anyone
placing anything in the car that could be construed as drugs prior to it leaving the motel parking
lot. Nor did William meet anyone at the McDonald's who could have been a potential customer.
While the police may have believed that drugs had been in the car with Parton at some
unspecified time in the past, they never offered any testimony that they believed, or that could
support a belief on their part, that there were drugs in the car when William was driving it. The
District Court's finding that the police believed there were drugs in the car is not supported by
the evidence and should not have been found to support a Terry stop of William.
There was no reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain William once he had
provided his identification to the police. Because his continued detention was unconstitutional
under both the state and federal constitutions, all evidence obtained thereafter should have been
suppressed.
Appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective in abandoning this meritorious issue 011
appeal and the ineffectiveness was prejudicial to WiIlia111. Therefore, William now requests that
the order denying post-conviction relief be reversed and the matter remanded for further
proceedings.

B. William was Denied Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel When Counsel
Acted. Without any Stratepic Pumose, to Vitiate The Plea Agreement by Denying
William the Bargained for Benefit of Appellate Review of the Suppression

Motion
As discussed above, William was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel when
counsel failed to raise the meritorious suppression issue. In addition, William was also denied
effective assistance of appellate counsel when counsel vitiated his plea agreement by denying
him the bargained for benefit of appellate review of his suppression motion. For this reason also,
the order denying post-conviction relief should be reversed.
Ineffective assistance of counsel is established when it is shown that counsel's
performance is deficient and that the deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington.,
supra. The deficiency prong is met when it is demonstrated that counsel's performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness. Mitchell, supra; Aragon, supra. The prejudice
prong is met when it is demonstrated that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, the outcome would have been different. Mitchell, supra.

In this case, appellate counsel's performal~cefell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, because counsel acted to deny William the benefit of his plea agreement,
specifically, the opportunity for appellate review of his motion to suppress.
As set out in the Preamble of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct: "As an advocate,
a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the mles of the adversary system." IRPC,
Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities, Para. 2. This obligation in the case of a criminal defense
attorney is further explained in IRPC 3.1:
Meritorious Claims and Coiltentions

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue
therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous,
which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding that could result
in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that
every element of the case be established.
IRPC 3.1.
The commentary to the rule further explains:
[3] The lawyer's obligations under this Rule are subordinate to federal and state
constitutional law that entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance of
counsel in presenting a claim that otherwise would be prohibited under this Rule.

IRPC 3.1 Commentary
Together these statements in the Rules of Professional Conduct make clear that defense
counsel in a criminal case is to zealously assert the client's position, presenting all non-frivolous
claims. The language in the Rules requires that in representing clients in criminal matters,
counsel is to e n on the side of presenting issues rather than refusing to present them. The
commentary goes so far as to state that the constitutional guarantees of assistance of counsel may
even require at times presenting claims that would otherwise be prohibited because they are
frivolous.
In this case, as set out in the preceding sections of argument, William had a non-frivolous
appellate claim that his motion to suppress had been improperly denied. To not raise that issue
was objectively unreasonable. However, even if William's claim that his motion to suppress was
not so clearly meritorious, so clearly non-frivolous, not raising the claim was a violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct and thus was not objectively reasonable.
The Rules of Professional Conduct require defense counsel to zealously advocate for the

client. To come in as newly appointed appellate counsel and decline in a case i~lvolvinga
conditional guilty plea to raise the issue specifically preserved by the plea agreement is to failto
zealously advocate for the client. To decline to argue the preserved issue is to essentially negate
the plea agreement. To decline to argue the preserved issue is to deny the client the benefit he
sought, appellate review, through his plea agreement.
This conduct falls below an objective standard, the standard set out by the Rules of
Professio~~al
Conduct, and is thus deficient. Strickland v. Washington, supva; Mitchell, supra.
And, this conduct is prejudicial. If counsel had not declined to argue the suppression
motion on appeal, William would have had the benefit of his bargain. Whether or not the
appellate couit reversed the denial of the motion to suppress, William would have had what he
had bargained for, what he had given up many other co~lstitutionalrights to obtain, appellate
review. Had counsel not provided deficient representation, the outcome would have been
different because William would have obtained the benefit of his plea agreement. Id
This case, where William lost his bargained-for right to have his claim revieiwed on
appeal is similar to the situation in Roe v. Flores-Ovtega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000). The FlovesOrtegu Court wrote that:

We have long held that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the
defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally
unreasonable. See Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327,89 S.Ct. 1715,23
L.Ed.2d 340 (1969); cf: Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23,28, 119 S.Ct. 961,
143 L.Ed.2d 18 (1999) ("[Wlhen counsel fails to file a requested appeal, a
defendant is entitled to [a new] appeal without showing that his appeal would
likely have had merit"). This is so because a defendant who instructs counsel to
initiate an appeal reasonably relies upon counsel to iile the necessary notice.
Counsel's failure to do so cannot be considered a strategic decision; filing a notice
of appeal is a purely ministerial task, and the failure to file reflects inattention to
the defendant's wishes. . . . See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,751,103 S.Ct.

3308,77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (accused has ultimate authority to make fundainental
decision whether to take an appeal).
528 U.S. at 477. It logically follows from this that the failure to raise a specifically preserved
issue on appeal is also deficient performance.
Ilere, William specifically instructed his trial attorney to obtain a conditional plea of
guilty a~ldto file a Notice of Appeal. In light of those facts it was deficient perfonnance for
appellate counsel to fail to raise the issue on appeal. See Flores-Ortega, supra.
Of course, the second part of the Striclcland v. Washington test requires the defendant to
show prejudice from counsel's deficient performance. And, William was prejudiced, as set forth
above. In this situation, however, prejudice should be presumed by the total loss of the appellate
review of the preserved issue. As explained in Flores-Ortega:
Today's case is unusual in that counsel's alleged deficient performance arguably
led not to a judicial proceeding of disputed reliability, but rather to the forfeiture
of a proceeding itself. According to respondent, counsel's deficient perfonnance
deprived him of a notice of appeal and, he~lce,an appeal altogether. Assuming
those allegations are true, counsel S deficient performance has deprived
respondent of more than a fair judicial proceeding; that deficiency deprived
respondent of the appellate proceeding altogether. In Cronic, Penson, and
Robbirzs, we held that the complete denial of counsel during a critical stage of a
judicial proceeding mandates a presumption of prejudice because "the adversary
process itself' has been rendered "presumptively unreliable." Cronic, supra, at
659, 104 S.Ct. 2039. The even more serious denial of the entire judicial
proceediizg itself; which a defendant wanted at the time and to which he had a
right, similarly demands a presumption ofprejudice. Put simply, we cannot
accord any '"presumption of reliability,"' Robbins, at 286, 120 S.Ct. 746, to
judicial proceedings that never took place.
528 U.S. at 483 (emphasis added).
"Accordingly," the Court went on to hold that, "to show prejudice in these circumstances,
a defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

deficient failure to coilsult with him about an appeal, he would have timely appealed." 528 U.S.
at 484. By analogy, William has met his burden in this regard because he made it clear to
appellate counsel that he wanted the suppression issue preserved by tbe coilditional plea
agreement raised. Erik's failure to do so is prejudiceper se in these limited circumstances.
For this reason also, the order denying post-conviction relief should now be reversed.
V. CONCLUSION

The order denying post-conviction relief should be reversed for two reasons. First, the
order should be reversed because William was denied constitutioilally effective assistance of
counsel when counsel failed to raise a meritorious suppression argument on appeal, which, if
raised would, with reasonable probability, have changed the outcome of the appeal. Second, the
order should be reversed because William was denied constitutionally effective assistance of
counsel when counsel acted to vitiate the plea agreement by denying William the benefit of his
agreement, specifically, appellate review of his suppression motion. Had counsel not provided
deficient assistance, the outcome of the proceeding absolutely would have been different because
William would have obtained the benefit of his agreement, appellate review.
William now asks this Court to reverse the order denying post-conviction relief and
remand the case for further proceedings.
I

"

Respectfully submitted this B d a y of February, 2009.

Deborah Whivvle
..
Attorneys for Appellant William Leer

CERTIFICATE OF S VICE
I Dennis Benjamin, hereby certify that on this
day of February, 2009, I deposited two
true copies of the foregoing brief in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: Office of
the Idaho State Attorney General, Criminal Law Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, I
D 83720-0010.

18?

